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This guide explains how to debug sandbox policy issues when developing or troubleshooting BoxLite’s macOS sandbox isolation.

Overview

BoxLite uses macOS’s built-in sandbox system (Seatbelt) to isolate the boxlite-shim process. The sandbox uses SBPL (Sandbox Profile Language) policies that whitelist specific operations. When an operation is denied, macOS logs the denial to the system log.

Quick Reference

# Real-time monitoring (recommended during development)
log stream --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "Sandbox:" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "boxlite"'

# Check recent denials (last 5 minutes)
log show --last 5m --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "Sandbox:" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "deny"'

Debugging Workflow

1

Enable real-time log monitoring

Open a separate terminal and start monitoring sandbox messages:
# Watch all sandbox denials
log stream --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.sandbox"' --level error

# Or filter for boxlite specifically
log stream --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "boxlite-shim" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "deny"'
2

Run your test

In another terminal, run the operation that is failing:
source .venv/bin/activate
python -c "
import asyncio
import boxlite

async def test():
    async with boxlite.SimpleBox(image='alpine:latest') as box:
        result = await box.exec('echo', 'hello')
        print(result.stdout)

asyncio.run(test())
"
3

Analyze denials

Sandbox denials appear in the format:
kernel: (Sandbox) Sandbox: boxlite-shim(PID) deny(1) OPERATION TARGET
Common denial types:
OperationTargetMeaning
file-read-data/path/to/fileProcess tried to read file contents
file-read-metadata/pathProcess tried to stat/access file metadata
file-write-data/path/to/fileProcess tried to write to file
file-write-create/path/to/fileProcess tried to create new file
sysctl-readkern.bootargsProcess tried to read sysctl value
mach-lookupcom.apple.serviceProcess tried to connect to mach service
network-outbound*:443Process tried to make network connection
iokit-openIOHIDFamilyProcess tried to access IOKit device
4

Update the policy

Based on the denial, add the appropriate rule to the SBPL policy:
; For file-read-data /var
(allow file-read* (literal "/var"))

; For sysctl-read kern.bootargs
(allow sysctl-read (sysctl-name "kern.bootargs"))

; For mach-lookup com.apple.service
(allow mach-lookup (global-name "com.apple.service"))
5

Rebuild and test

After updating .sbpl files, rebuild to pick up changes:
# The .sbpl files are embedded via include_str!
# Touch the Rust file to force recompilation
make dev:python

# Or for just the Rust library
cargo clean -p boxlite && cargo build -p boxlite

Log Commands Reference

Real-time Streaming

# All sandbox messages
log stream --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.sandbox"'

# Only errors (denials)
log stream --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.sandbox"' --level error

# Specific process
log stream --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "boxlite-shim"'

# Combined: boxlite denials only
log stream --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "Sandbox:" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "boxlite" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "deny"'

Historical Queries

# Last N minutes
log show --last 5m --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "Sandbox:"'

# Time range
log show --start "2024-01-06 10:00:00" --end "2024-01-06 10:05:00" \
  --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.sandbox"'

# Count denials by type
log show --last 10m \
  --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "Sandbox:" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "deny"' \
  | grep -oE 'deny\(1\) [^ ]+' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn

Filtering Tips

# Exclude noisy system processes
log show --last 5m --predicate 'eventMessage CONTAINS "Sandbox:" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "deny" AND NOT eventMessage CONTAINS "imagent" AND NOT eventMessage CONTAINS "bluetoothd"'

# Only kernel messages (most reliable)
log show --last 5m --predicate 'senderImagePath == "/kernel" AND eventMessage CONTAINS "Sandbox:"'

SBPL Policy Syntax

Basic Structure

(version 1)

; Deny everything by default
(deny default)

; Allow specific operations
(allow process-exec)
(allow file-read* (subpath "/usr/lib"))
(allow sysctl-read (sysctl-name "hw.ncpu"))

Common Patterns

; Allow reading entire directory tree
(allow file-read* (subpath "/path/to/dir"))

; Allow reading single file only
(allow file-read* (literal "/path/to/file"))

; Allow reading files matching pattern
(allow file-read* (regex #"^/Users/[^/]+/\.boxlite/"))

; Allow multiple sysctls
(allow sysctl-read
    (sysctl-name "hw.ncpu")
    (sysctl-name "hw.memsize")
    (sysctl-name-prefix "kern.proc."))

; Allow mach service lookup
(allow mach-lookup
    (global-name "com.apple.CoreServices.coreservicesd")
    (global-name "com.apple.system.logger"))

Testing Syntax

# Test if policy syntax is valid
sandbox-exec -p '(version 1)(deny default)(allow process-exec)' /bin/echo "Policy OK"

# Test with a file
sandbox-exec -f /path/to/policy.sbpl /bin/echo "Policy OK"

BoxLite Policy Files

BoxLite’s sandbox policy is split into multiple files:
FilePurpose
seatbelt_base_policy.sbplProcess ops, sysctls, mach services, IOKit
seatbelt_file_read_policy.sbplStatic system paths for reading
seatbelt_file_write_policy.sbplStatic paths for writing (/tmp)
seatbelt_network_policy.sbplNetwork access (optional)
macos.rsDynamic paths (binary, volumes, box_dir)

Viewing the Generated Policy

To see the complete generated policy:
use boxlite::jailer::{SecurityOptions, write_sandbox_profile};

let security = SecurityOptions::default();
let box_dir = Path::new("/tmp/test-box");
let binary_path = Path::new("/path/to/boxlite-shim");

write_sandbox_profile(
    Path::new("/tmp/debug-policy.sbpl"),
    &security,
    box_dir,
    binary_path,
).unwrap();
Then inspect /tmp/debug-policy.sbpl.

Common Issues

1. Changes Not Taking Effect

The .sbpl files are embedded at compile time via include_str!. After modifying them:
# Force recompilation
cargo clean -p boxlite
cargo build -p boxlite

# For Python SDK
make dev:python

2. Path Canonicalization

macOS uses symlinks (/var -> /private/var, /tmp -> /private/tmp). Use canonical paths in your policy:
; Wrong - /tmp is a symlink
(allow file-write* (subpath "/tmp"))
Use the canonical path instead:
; Correct - use canonical path
(allow file-write* (subpath "/private/tmp"))

3. Duplicate Denials

The log may show “X duplicate reports for…”. This means the same denial happened multiple times. Fix the root cause, not each duplicate.

4. Silent Failures

Some denials do not appear in logs immediately. If the process hangs or crashes without logged denials:
1

Check for crash reports

ls ~/Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/*shim*
2

Verify process started

Check host logs to ensure the process actually started.
3

Run without sandbox

Try running without the sandbox to isolate whether the issue is sandbox-related.

5. Permissions vs Sandbox

Not all failures are sandbox-related. Also check:
  • File permissions (ls -la)
  • Directory existence
  • Hypervisor.framework entitlements

Debugging Checklist

Use this checklist when investigating sandbox denials:
  • Start log streaming before running test
  • Filter logs for your process name
  • Check for deny(1) messages
  • Note the exact operation and target
  • Add minimal rule to policy (prefer literal over subpath)
  • Document WHY the rule is needed (in comments)
  • Rebuild and retest
  • Verify no new denials appear

Further Reading